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Vanderbilt Law School, and Department of Biological Sciences, Vanderbilt University, 131 21st Avenue South,
Nashville, TN 37203-1181, USA (owen.jones@vanderbilt.edu)
This paper discusses several issues at the intersection of law and brain science. It focuses principally on ways
in which an improved understanding of how evolutionary processes affect brain function and human behaviour may improve law’s ability to regulate behaviour. It explores sample uses of such ‘evolutionary analysis in
law’ and also raises questions about how that analysis might be improved in the future. Among the discussed
uses are: (i) clarifying cost–benefit analyses; (ii) providing theoretical foundation and potential predictive
power; (iii) assessing comparative effectiveness of legal strategies; and (iv) revealing deep patterns in legal
architecture. Throughout, the paper emphasizes the extent to which effective law requires: (i) building
effective behavioural models; (ii) integrating life-science perspectives with social-science perspectives; (iii)
considering the effects of brain biology on behaviours that law seeks to regulate; and (iv) examining the
effects of evolutionary processes on brain design.
Keywords: law; evolutionary analysis in law; brain; human behaviour; behavioural biology
1. INTRODUCTION
The odds seem stacked against the Saharan desert ant
Cataglyphis. It must forage alone in scorching temperatures. It must travel vast distances. It must loop and zigzag
in constant pursuit of the heat-stressed prey that it must
somehow locate, overcome, and then carry. Perhaps most
dauntingly, with prey or without, each ant must make
its way back to a small and far-distant nest entrance,
out there—somewhere—in a numbingly monotonous landscape.
Yet, from the moment it starts to return, no matter where
it is and no matter how peripatetic its prior wanderings,
Cataglyphis travels a straight line back to the nest. How can
this be?
To do this, each Cataglyphis ant needs to keep track as it
travels of its changing orientation with respect to the nest,
so as to know which direction to head when returning. It
also needs to update its approximate distance from the nest
continuously, so that when it travels in the right direction it
knows when to stop and begin a local search, neither overnor under-shooting the actual entrance.
Using an ingenious combination of observation, experiments, robotics, artificial intelligence and neurophysiology, the zoologist Rudiger Wehner has demonstrated that
the Cataglyphis compass is updated and optically mapped
against ambient light, upon emergence from the nest, with
the aid of the ant’s multiple polarized lenses (Wehner
2003). Even more impressively, the Cataglyphis distance
calculator can translate the varying three-dimensional
heights and inclines of wanderings into a two-dimensional
map (which is necessary, for example, if the outward journey is hilly and the return route is flat). This is rather
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remarkable for a species ignorant of trigonometry and
sporting a brain that weighs barely one ten-thousandth of a
gram.
The human brain, by contrast, weighs 13 million times
as much, ca. 1300 g. What purposes call on such power?
Although the brain constitutes merely 2% of our body
weight, the brain’s activities consume ca. 20% of the calories we ingest. Given the relentlessness with which natural
selection punishes waste, such an energetically costly
device must provide some significant compensating benefits. What these are, how they are procured and by what
processes they came to be procured are among the great
questions in modern science.
The editors asked each author in this theme issue to
explore various implications of modern brain science for
law. Each author will probably frame these implications
differently. Here is how I would frame them. Law deals in
behaviour, and behaviour arises (principally) from the
brain. So learning more about brain design and function
should prove useful to legal thinkers, who so often are
tasked with changing various aspects of human behaviour
to ensure that, by and large, people behave the way society
prefers.
We could preliminarily subdivide into two main contexts
the usefulness of bringing law and brain science together.
The first context concerns internal states: what is happening on the inside, within the brain (as it perceives, assesses
and chooses, for example). The second context concerns
external effects: what happens on the outside as a function
of brain operation (when a person behaves in ways discernible by others).
We could further subdivide legal issues relevant to
the internal states of the brain into those concerning
intervention technologies and those concerning imaging
technologies (Garland 2004). Intervention technologies
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include existing drugs, as well as drugs in development,
that may enhance cognitive capabilities. For example,
researchers are reportedly investigating drugs commonly
used to treat depression or attention deficit hyperactivity
disorders (such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
and noradrenaline (norepinephrine) reuptake inhibitors)
for their potentially cognition-enhancing capabilities in
non-depressed individuals. Efforts are apparently underway to develop drugs that boost the levels of chemicals in
the brain (such as cyclic adenosine monophosphate
(cAMP), cAMP response element binding protein (CREB)
and glutamate) involved in amplifying memory. And
transcranial magnetic stimulation, which has been shown
to be capable of exciting or inhibiting various areas of the
brain, may also be capable of thereby enhancing certain
cognitive functions (Tancredi 2004). How, if at all, should
the legal system regulate such intervention technologies?
In contrast to these intervention technologies, imaging
technologies enable us to perceive non-invasively what the
brain is doing when a person engages in various physical or
mental tasks. These technologies include existing techniques, as well as those in development, that may eventually
help us to decide (to give just three examples of many) whether a witness or defendant is competent, whether an
unconscious person is brain dead or whether a person is
lying (Tancredi 2004).
For example, techniques in development that use nearinfrared brain scans and magnetic resonance imaging can
reveal activity in the prefrontal cortex and the anterior
cingulate cortex in the superior frontal gyrus, respectively.
Such techniques have already started to illuminate the
neural basis for social cooperation (Rilling et al. 2002).
Will these technologies someday enable us to identify the
neurophysiological predicates of ‘normal’ self-control or to
witness the effects of brain damage on law-relevant
mental processing? Some preliminary brain-imaging work
is already underway that appears to show the brain-state
differences between thinking about a just result to a legal
conflict and applying a provided rule to resolve that conflict
(Schultz et al. 2001). Might this someday tell us something
useful about how to encourage jurors to think more or less
about either justice or rules, or about how to better achieve
a desired balance of the two?
A new electroencephalograph (EEG) technique can
apparently detect a particular brain-wave pattern known as
P-300, the presence of which, many believe, reliably indicates that the brain is recognizing a familiar stimulus (Tancredi 2004). Will these and other windows on brain
function ultimately tell us anything legally useful about
whether a person is lying? Will the presence of the P-300
enable us to detect lying more reliably than when traditional lie-detectors are used? Suppose the stimulus is a
picture of a crime scene that a suspect denies ever visiting.
Should ‘brain fingerprinting’ evidence that reveals an
absence of a P-300 wave in the defendant’s brain when he
was shown a picture of the crime scene be allowed as evidence in support of his defence? Courts have only recently
begun to address such questions (e.g. Terry Harrington
versus State of Iowa, Supreme Court of Iowa, 659 N. W.
2d 509 (2003)).
Neuroscientific advances relating to the brain’s internal
states have already raised a host of legal questions concerning evidence, privacy, patents and the like (Greely 2004).
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)

What are the limits of discoverable correspondences
between mental states and brain states? For some, advancing technologies raise variations on already-important
questions concerning free will and responsibility (Gazzaniga & Steven 2004; Morse 2004). For others, technology
offers the promise of revealing the neural bases of deciding,
choosing, intending and acting.
Legal issues relevant to the external effects of brain function are somewhat different. The brain is, in many respects,
a machine designed to correlate patterns of stimuli with
patterns of behaviour. Behaviours relevant to law are products of perception, information-processing, emotions,
deliberations, decisions and other states of the brain operating in dynamic ways that often reciprocally affect one
another. Will a more detailed understanding of brain function enable us to predict a person’s behaviour with the
degree of confidence that different legal contexts may
require? (Greely 2004). For example, would we want such
an understanding to play any role in parole decisions, when
the likelihood of recidivism is at issue?
The two different kinds of causes of behaviour, which
biologists term ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ (Mayr 1961),
contribute to each of the two general contexts, discussed
above, in which the legal system might attend to brain
science: internal states and external effects. (Readers will
recall that proximate causes involve immediate causal pathways and mechanisms; ultimate causes reflect the evolutionary pathways by which some proximate cues, rather
than others, came to be correlated with some behavioural
outputs, rather than others; Goldsmith & Zimmerman
2001.)
Biologists already know that proximate and ultimate
causes are always present simultaneously. Every action of
every organism reflects not only its unique developmental
history and immediate environment but also its evolved
species-typical capabilities and behavioural predispositions. To date, however, most of the law’s limited attention
to brain biology focuses exclusively on proximate causes.
This may be because proximate causes are often easier to
study. Or it may be because technological advances typically stem from studies of proximate causes and typically
intervene among proximate causes.
There are probably other reasons too, but here I wish to
underscore several advantages to law of knowing more
about the ultimate evolutionary causes of human brain
design and about the relationship between evolved behavioural predispositions and resulting behaviour.
A growing number of scholars (compiled in Jones 2004b)
have for some time been engaged in what I have elsewhere
described as ‘evolutionary analysis in law’ ( Jones 1997a).
Their common enterprise is to use knowledge about evolutionary processes, animal behaviour or both in ways that
may further legal goals. In that enterprise, some things are
known and many more are yet to be known.
In what follows, I first discuss the often underrecognized importance to law of sound behavioural models. I argue that these models—to be maximally effective—
should eventually include life-science perspectives on the
proximate and ultimate causes of human brain function. I
then turn to raise briefly a variety of questions that need
further attention as evolutionary analysis in law develops.
The subsequent section offers some general thoughts about
assessing and incorporating interdisciplinary perspectives,
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such as those from biology. The final section provides a few
brief illustrations of where and how evolutionary analysis in
law can be useful.

2. LAW, BIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOURAL MODELS
For historical reasons, the social sciences and the life sciences remain more frequently divided than their significantly overlapping interests in humans might otherwise
suggest. Specifically, the study of human behaviour is too
often too separated from the study of animal behaviour.
Over-separation is unsound; human behaviour is a subset
of animal behaviour, and therefore the studies of each
must in the end reconcile with studies of the other. Overseparation is also unwise; it can obscure patterns that offer
both knowledge and utility, and that can be costly.
Integrating the behavioural aspects of social sciences and
life sciences into a seamless behavioural science should
have particular appeal to legal policy-makers. Society often
charges legal policy-makers with moving a large human
population to behave more this way and less that way, consistent with democratically percolated and pre-articulated
goals. And a deeper understanding of the relationship
between human behaviour and the brain’s design and function should prove useful to that enterprise.
There are many fields in biology that can contribute to
that deeper understanding. One such field is behavioural
genetics, which attempts to trace the different behaviours
of different individuals to different genes among them.
Another is neuroanatomy, which can reveal where and how
human states originate in the brain. To these (and others)
one can add evolutionary biology, which helps to illuminate how different behaviours of different individuals can
flow from species-typical brains that sport highly contingent evolved algorithms (which in turn increase or decrease
the probabilities of given behavioural responses in reaction
to varying environmental conditions).
It may be easy for legal policy-makers to ignore or to forget that evolutionary processes influence human behaviour
as well as human morphology. For one thing, legal policymakers often ignore a great many behavioural disciplines at
a time, not just biological disciplines, when they deploy
insights on behaviour that typically reflect various admixtures of common sense, sociology, religion, philosophy and
the like. Also, legal policy-makers typically lack significant
science education, and that enables deep misunderstandings about how genes, environments and evolutionary processes interact in ways that affect resultant behaviour. And
a few legal policy-makers (in common with some in the
general public) may still incorrectly assume that biological
explanations are inherently deterministic in a way that will
often lead to justifications for bad behaviour, converting
description into prescription, as if the only role for behavioural biology would be to acquit criminal defendants.
Nevertheless, there are many different ways in which
human behavioural biology can offer utility in law without
altering normative agendas. Carefully done, for example,
evolutionary analysis in law can help to reveal the unwarranted assumptions about how and why humans behave as
they do that underlie some existing legal policies. It can
help us to discover useful patterns in regulable behaviour,
which may lead to different regulatory strategies. And perPhil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)
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haps most generally, evolutionary analysis in law can help
to increase law’s effectiveness and efficiency.
Here is the four-step logic: (i) effective law requires an
effective behavioural model; (ii) law’s commonly used
behavioural models are importantly incomplete; (iii) building more robust behavioural models probably requires
(among other things) the integration of social-science models with life-science models; and (iv) integrating socialscience models with life-science models requires familiarity
with behavioural biology, including the effects of evolutionary processes on species-typical brain form and function. This logic unfolds in the following way.
First, almost anything law achieves it achieves by effecting changes in human behaviour. It effects changes, in
turn, by inspiring people (or in rare cases forcing them physically) to behave differently from the way they would
behave in the absence of the law’s intervention. The ability
to deploy legal tools to effect these changes at the least cost
to society is importantly affected by the accuracy of the
behavioural models on which law relies.
To put this more graphically, law is like a lever for moving behaviour, with a model of human behaviour serving as
its fulcrum. That behavioural-model fulcrum consists of
what we think we know about why people behave as they
do. That is, the behavioural model constitutes the aggregated insights that underlie our prediction that if law moves
this way, behaviour will move that way and not some other
way.
Because soft fulcra are poor fulcra, we can consider the
success of every legal system to depend, in part, on the solidity—that is, the accuracy and predictive power—of the
behavioural model on which it both rests and relies. Flawed
models will tend to yield less effective law, and legal
approaches to understanding and influencing human
behaviour that are based on outdated behavioural models
are simply less likely to effect socially and legally desirable
outcomes than are those based on more robust behavioural
models. Consequently, effective law will generally require
effective behavioural models.
Second, all theories of human behaviour are ultimately
theories about the brain. The brain, of course, is a corporeal biological phenomenon, and modern biology makes
it forcefully clear that the brain’s design, function and
behavioural outputs are all products of gene–environment
interactions.
At present, however, the legal system tends to build its
models for regulating behaviour by focusing only on the
kinds of influences to which social sciences attend. Though
these influences are useful to understand, they typically
contribute only the environmental components of the
gene–environment whole.
To put the magnitude of this oversight in sharp perspective: trying to build any human behavioural model from
social sciences without life sciences is like trying to make
iced tea with either water or tea leaves but not both. We
know that behaviour is the result of inseparable environmental and genetic effects. Therefore, the routine omission
of one of the two principal behavioural ingredients grossly
oversimplifies something inherently complex, ignores
interactions necessary for behaviour and renders law’s
general approach to behavioural models importantly
inaccurate and incomplete.
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Third, an objective reality underlies the influences on
human behaviour. This reality cannot be captured by simplistic models that posit environmental determinism. Of
course, integration of the behavioural sciences (both social
and life) and behavioural influences (both proximate and
ultimate) cannot guarantee perfect behavioural models.
But integration, if done carefully and well, is probably a significant step towards more effective, efficient and accurate
behavioural models than the ones legal thinkers commonly
employ.
Integrated models, far from oversimplifying human
behaviour, would reflect the most complete understanding
available of the multiple and complex influences on behaviour. They would vindicate, more fully than prevailing
unsupplemented social-constructivist models can alone,
our species’ unique history, consciousness, capabilities
and richly complex behavioural processes. Consequently,
building more robust behavioural models requires
integrating social-science models with life-science models.
Fourth and finally, we can probably best achieve that
integrated understanding of human behaviour by framing
human behaviours against the backdrop of the pervasive
evolutionary processes that enable and influence them.
This requires a broader cross-disciplinary perspective,
which at a minimum includes insights from evolutionary
biology. Ideally, this would involve greater education for
legal thinkers on both the immediate proximate causes of
behaviours and the evolutionary causes that provide important context.
To summarize these points, then: (i) effective law requires
an effective behavioural model; (ii) law’s existing set of models is importantly incomplete; (iii) improving the behavioural
models requires the integration of social-science and lifescience models of behaviour; and (iv) such integration
requires familiarity with behavioural biology. Put simply,
because improving behavioural models can yield more effective legal tools and because human behaviour is influenced
by the effects of evolutionary processes on the brain, greater
knowledge of how evolutionary processes influence behaviour may improve law’s ability to regulate it.

3. SEVERAL ISSUES WARRANTING FURTHER
EXPLORATION
The editors of this theme issue encouraged the authors to
raise questions about law and the brain, even when they had
no answers to provide. In this section I respond to that invitation by raising a variety of topics in need of further exploration. First, I make a few general remarks, to provide context.
We already know that the gap between legal and scientific communities—in methods, assumptions, purposes
and even vocabulary—is famously broad and observable in
myriad contexts. For example, the gap is evident in
environmental contexts, in which legal regulators attempt
to balance economic interests with harms to enormously
dynamic ecological systems. Also, it is evident in health
contexts, in which legal regulators attempt to weigh
toxicological risks against the costs of reducing those risks
expressed in opaque statistics. But the law–science gap
seems unusually broad in the context of human behaviour.
I propose three of many possible reasons.
First, not everyone agrees that understanding more
about the biology of brains and behaviours is a good thing.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)

The historical over-division of reality into distinctly different disciplinary subcomponents (which in turn contributed
to knowledge and culture gaps between disciplines) often
creates turf wars over who speaks with importance on what
topics. So, for example, biological perspectives on behaviour often encounter resistance from practitioners of sociology, philosophy and gender studies, as each of these
disciplines has its own theories about where behaviour
comes from.
Second, those who voice scepticism about biological perspectives on the brain are sometimes right. For example,
they are right to raise concerns about the potential for misuse of biological information, because biology has been
misused in the past. Properly understood, these are arguments more for caution than for exclusion. But caution is
nonetheless often warranted. People respond differently to
claims that evolutionary processes affect behaviour from
the way they respond to claims that television and advertising affect behaviour.
Third, there is still widespread persistence of emotional
commitment to human exceptionalism. We do not want to
think that our transcendent capabilities are the products of
purely terrestrial mechanisms. As my colleague Michael
Saks succinctly put it in conversation: ‘people don’t want to
be caused’.
Against this background, here are a few issues I would
like to see more carefully explored in preparation for future
evolutionary analysis in law. They are not unique to evolutionary analysis, but they seem particularly salient there.
(a) What standards of proof are appropriate in those
contexts in which law and behavioural biology meet?
This is not as easy to answer as one might at first think.
On the one hand, we generally want to base our legal
approaches on well-established scientific principles. After
all, why risk a change in legal policy if facts are still fuzzy?
On the other hand, even brief reflection suggests that the
situation is far too complicated for an approach that
excludes all but well-established insights. There is an enormous literature spanning science, the history of science and
philosophy of science that grapples with issues surrounding
standards of proof. Although disagreements abound, it is at
least presently clear that different standards of proof are
customary when there are different purposes to different
activities.
Basic research scientists are the most conservative,
because they want to build edifices of knowledge with
building blocks that are highly unlikely to be wrong.
Applied scientists adopt more varying standards to meet
the particular probabilities of costs and benefits in the specific contexts in which they may be working. Similarly,
legal policy-makers have long correlated different standards of proof with different interests at stake (Faigman
2002). Evidence sufficient for legislative action is measured
differently from evidence in adjudicative contexts, for
example. The latter are even further differentiated: the
criminal threshold for proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’,
for example, is far higher, and appropriately so, than the
civil threshold of ‘the preponderance of the evidence’. Law
and science play very different roles, and there are very
different sub-roles within each. Thus we explicitly or
implicitly want there to be—and indeed need there to be—
standards of proof that vary context by context.
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Nevertheless, we need to know more about what this
means for evolutionary analysis in law. It probably means
four things at a minimum. First, it probably means that we
must think harder about who within the scientific community speaks with authority when hypotheses are disputed. Second, it probably means that we should
remember that risks surrounding uncertainty tend to come
in pairs. That is, it is not clear that the risk in law of treating
a biobehavioural hypothesis as true when it is not true is
greater than the risk of treating it as untrue if in fact it is
true. The magnitudes of these respective risks (false positives and false negatives) will vary by context. Third, it
probably means that law should not deploy a single standard of proof for incorporating into law a biobehavioural
hypothesis, since the presence of differing risks can logically support differing standards of proof. Fourth, and
more specifically, it probably means that we should not
automatically apply to the hypotheses of different disciplines whatever standard of proof is generally dominant
within that discipline. To do so could, paradoxically, privilege a non-scientific perspective over a more scientific one,
simply because the former is more easily supported within
the discipline from which it hails.
(b) What should ‘testability’ mean where law and
behavioural biology meet?
On the one hand, it is inherent in the notion of science
that hypotheses should be testable. On the other hand, the
concept of testability is often misunderstood in legal circles. Hypotheses are sometimes incorrectly deemed untestable because there are no immediately practical ways, given
the existing state of technological affairs, to test the hypothesis. In fact, only some naturalistic way of testing the
hypothesis is necessary to satisfy the testability criterion,
even if it requires means that are beyond our current technological capacities. Something can be appropriately testable in theory, even if not immediately testable in fact. Also,
hypotheses are sometimes incorrectly deemed untestable
when the necessary tests would require clearly unethical
treatment of human beings. However, this renders the tests
impermissible, not impossible. Hypotheses are sometimes
also incorrectly deemed untestable because it is assumed
that only traditional experiments are tests. However, it
is widely agreed in animal-behaviour communities that,
in addition to experiments, appropriately conducted
observational and comparative techniques can also test
hypotheses.
Clearly, we want to test hypotheses by the best means
available. But what the best means are, and what degrees of
confidence different means will provide, necessarily vary.
Hypotheses about proximate mechanisms are often more
easily tested than hypotheses about historical pathways of
evolutionary processes. How should this affect our willingness to entertain evolutionary hypotheses? And how shall
we deal, in law, with the general principle that conclusions
drawn from tests of hypotheses are necessarily functions of
considered judgement rather than unimpeachable empirical reality? We often draw, in other contexts, conclusions
about what is probably true in humans on the basis of
admittedly unrealistic studies of other animals. For
instance, the hypothesis that a given substance will be
safe in a large population of humans with varying physical
characteristics, at a particular dosage, is generally tested by
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)
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tabulating adverse effects of mega-doses of that substance
given to a comparatively small number of animals of a
non-human species. We need to think more about what
testability means in the context of law and behavioural
biology.
(c) What role does the general concept
of falsifiability play where law and behavioural
biology meet?
Falsifiability is important. However, precisely what role
falsifiability plays in science, and precisely what it means
when applied in differing contexts, are not nearly as clear as
they are often thought to be. On the one hand, the existence of a falsifiable hypothesis has come to be seen by many
in law as an infallible discriminator between good science
and non-science. (For instance, the US Supreme Court
invoked the principle reverentially in Daubert versus
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U. S. 579 (1993).) On
the other hand, the falsifiability criterion is more subtle to
apply than to discuss, and it has been subjected to sufficiently strong and numerous critiques that it is rather
widely regarded by scientists and philosophers of science as
by no means infallible, despite its demonstrated utility. A
growing literature suggests that the principle of falsifiability
does not play nearly as important a role in how scientists
actually conduct their research as the popular image suggests (Hempel 1966; Woodward & Goodstein 1996;
Goodstein 2000; Ulen 2002).
To make matters even more complicated, the notion of
falsifiability is often further misunderstood in some legal
circles, because of a failure to differentiate between falsifying a hypothesis, on the one hand, and falsifying a general
theoretical framework (the metatheory) from which the
hypothesis is generated, on the other. That is, it is sometimes assumed in legal discussions concerning behavioural
biology that if a given hypothesis about how humans might
be expected to behave proves incorrect then somehow the
notion is also incorrect that humans are meaningfully influenced in these behaviours by the effects of evolutionary
processes on brains. That does not follow. But precisely
what does follow warrants more rigorous examination.
(d) What is the proper role of parsimony in
evolutionary analysis in law?
Like falsifiability, parsimony is more frequently invoked
than defined. Indeed, even the literature that specifically
addresses it reflects no single settled definition. In legal circles, it is sometimes incorrectly assumed that the sole criterion for parsimoniousness is the number of assumptions a
theory requires, with preference to be afforded to that
theory with the fewest. But this is probably importantly
incomplete. Many have noted that the same claims can be
formulated in so many different ways that the number of
constituent assumptions is not easily determined. Moreover, even were we to employ only the definition of
parsimony that counts the readily agreed number of
assumptions, parsimoniousness properly favours not the
theory with the fewest assumptions but rather the theory
with the fewest assumptions that is consistent with all the
known facts.
Further, I have on occasion observed legal scholars to
comment that any theory invoking evolutionary influences
on human behaviours is necessarily less parsimonious than
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one that assumes no such influences. After all, the reasoning goes, why complicate matters by adding in biology if
culture without biobehavioural hypotheses can adequately
explain a given phenomenon? This reasoning misses two
important points. First, culture cannot be divorced from
biology, inasmuch as all behaviour reflects the interaction
between genes and environment. Second, a theory that dispenses with evolutionary history raises more complications
than it dismisses. (To think that the historical context
evolutionary history provides necessarily renders a given
behavioural theory less parsimonious is to think that a
theory of a building that starts on the ground floor is less
parsimonious than a theory of a building that starts on the
50th floor, because the latter requires 49 fewer assumptions.) The important point is that parsimony, too, bears
clarifying in the context of behavioural biology.
(e) What is a mechanism, and in what contexts need
it be specified?
Darwin was the first to demonstrate that the effects of
evolutionary processes can be meaningfully identified and
understood, even if various relevant mechanisms (in his
case, the particles of heredity) are not known. What will
count as a mechanism for behaviours relevant to law?
When should reference to a mechanism be required? And
when, in any event, would knowing genetic, neuroanatomical or neurochemical mechanisms be useful in law?
Some people reject a given evolutionary perspective on
human brain functioning so long as neither the genetic nor
the neuroanatomical mechanisms influencing the resultant
behaviour have been identified. (I have elsewhere referred
to this as ‘The Argument from Missing Mechanism’; Jones
2001d .) On the one hand, this seems an over-conservative
basis for rejecting potentially useful knowledge: we know
neither the genetic nor the complete neuroanatomical
pathways for sleeping behaviour or sexual desire, and yet
no one seriously disputes that these are products of evolutionary, rather than purely sociocultural, phenomena. On
the other hand, it seems a mistake to forget that evolutionary processes do require actual practical mechanisms. How
shall we know when mechanisms will matter to law?
(f) How shall we best understand the relationship
between theories and empiricism where law and
behavioural biology meet?
Some have argued that we do not need evolutionary theories, in law, because we can just observe how people
behave and then formulate legal regimes accordingly. They
have the advantage of common sense: who needs theory
when facts will do? On the other hand, data do not collect
and organize themselves into patterns from which important conclusions can be drawn. This is one of the reasons
why the purely observational approach (sometimes known
as inductivism, Baconian inductivism (after proponent
Francis Bacon) or naive inductivism) was largely rejected
as either a descriptively accurate or a normatively sufficient
and appropriate approach for generating knowledge. (In
part, it seemed clear that the very process of attending to
some facts while ignoring others, and cross-correlating
some facts with others, is necessarily a function of some
pre-existing theory, however tentatively advanced.)
To the extent that inductivism has been replaced by a
less rigid and more dynamic process involving theory forPhil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)

mulation, data collection and theory reformulation (Woodward & Goodstein 1996), what does this mean for
evolutionary analysis in law? Is there any systematic way to
anticipate when theory is likely to be more useful or less
useful?
(g) What role should prediction play in evolutionary
analysis in law?
On the one hand, we expect science to help us to predict
narrow aspects of the future. For instance, science has
helped us to predict with great accuracy the flight trajectory
of cannon-ball after cannon-ball. On the other hand,
organisms are not cannon-balls. One cannot predict with
great accuracy the precise foraging pattern of even a single
Cataglyphis ant, let alone the future behaviour of an individual human being. This cannot mean that predictions, in
the life sciences, are simply unnecessary or up for grabs.
Predictions in behavioural biology are inherently probabilistic. They often attend not to the behaviour of an individual but rather to the patterns most likely to emerge from the
collected behaviours of a large number of individuals. That
is importantly parallel to what much of law is about: trying
to affect populations in probabilistic ways. So thinking that
biology is unhelpful to law because it cannot predict the
behaviour of a single identified individual is like thinking
that meteorology is unhelpful to sailors because it cannot
predict where an individual cloud will rain, or thinking that
geology is unhelpful to oil companies because sometimes
there is no oil where geologists think there might be.
Biology and physics are sufficiently different that we expect
different things from their predictions. But what else do we
need to know about the process of making useful biological
predictions? By what measure do we determine whether a
prediction is valuable or not?
4. DISCUSSION
That was but a small sampling of the questions warranting
further exploration. Others include: what does biology
have to tell us about how law-relevant behaviours are likely,
in theory, to vary across animal populations? What does
biology have to tell us about the ways in which law-relevant
behaviours are likely to manifest, phenotypically, in human
populations? What environmental variables are most associated with given law-relevant behaviours? What can we
learn from studies of other animals about patterns in behaviours suggesting a sense of fairness, justice, property,
trust, jealousy and deception? To what extent does the
change from ancestral to modern environments contribute
to an ability, or inability, to say something useful about
evolved law-relevant features of the human brain?
Given the foregoing questions, how can we decide whether, when and how to incorporate evolutionary perspectives on the human brain, and hence on human behaviour,
into law? Undoubtedly, it will require judgement on a context-by-context basis. Nonetheless, a few general remarks
are in order.
It is important to distinguish the separate relationships
that law and science have with reality. Speaking generally,
scientists and legal policy-makers share an interest in
gaining an improved understanding of reality. However,
scientists and legal policy-makers are trying to achieve very
different things, and this has implications for how insights
from science can or should enter the legal arena. While
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scientists often seek an improved understanding of reality
for its own sake (and ever subject to revision), legal
policy-makers are instrumentalists, charged by society with
juggling a number of often conflicting goals and effecting
positive change in some contexts, often at some cost in
other contexts.
For example, a rule that affords present justice to one
category of individual may do injustice to many more in the
future. A policy that increases freedom of speech may paradoxically protect harmful hostile speech. A population may
want increased national security but bemoan intrusions on
privacy. An elected representative may see that a majority
of his constituents support a legislative outcome that will
later have adverse effects that those constituents do not yet
recognize and later will not want. Tax rates sufficient to
ensure the safest achievable food, through governmental
oversight, may be higher than citizens are willing to pay.
Ensuring that drugs (for example, AIDS drugs) are safe
and effective may slow their delivery to patients, some of
whom may die waiting.
This is not to say that instrumentalism makes an accurate understanding of a situation irrelevant. There are in
fact many ways—none of them perfect—in which legal systems encourage the discovery and incorporation of truth in
legal affairs. For example, oversight agencies, backed by
government lawyers, try to ensure efficient markets by
creating incentives for accurate corporate disclosures.
Litigants, through discovery rules and adversarial processes, are encouraged to present and support, through evidence, truths relevant to disputes. Both elected
representatives and agencies hold hearings on matters pertinent to new legislation and regulation. Freedom of the
press helps expose corruption, and legal academics theorize, criticize, propose and comment.
Nevertheless, legal policy-makers must often make
important choices in the absence of clear, accurate and
robust understandings of a situation. Disputants may have
equally supported but nonetheless materially inconsistent
versions of the facts. Some relevant facts—such as a person’s state of mind at the time he killed someone, allegedly
in self-defence—are simply not directly knowable. And,
most importantly for this discussion, circumstances may
warrant legal action before scientists have achieved a high
degree of certainty about a given phenomenon.
In fact, and for quite sensible reasons, we often want our
legal policy-makers to act before confidence is very high or
a situation is understood thoroughly. Imagine, for instance,
that scientific studies suggest a possible connection
between the amount of chemical x released from the
smokestack of corporation y and the incidence of leukaemia in the children of local neighbourhood z, where you
and your children live. How certain would you want your
legislators to be of the causal relationship between the
chemical and leukaemia before they intervene to prohibit—
even if temporarily—the flow of chemical x into the air your
children breathe? One hundred per cent certain? Seventyfive per cent? Even at 50% certain there are coin-flipping
odds that this chemical materially increases your child’s
risk of developing leukaemia. For this reason, many people
would prefer some regulatory action at even lower
thresholds of certainty. How probable must something be
before you would prefer that it be considered operationally
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)
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true—for the time being—until better information comes
along?
Clearly, when legal policy is at issue, we want our relative
concern for certainty to vary as a function of the severity of
the harms to be avoided and the benefits that might,
through inaction, be foregone. The key points are these: (i)
scientists and legal policy-makers undertake entirely different things; (ii) the degree of certainty to which scientists
aspire is different from the degree of certainty necessary for
legal action, just as we want it to be; and (iii) the degree of
certainty necessary for legal action will vary as a function of
the costs and benefits that a given problem and its partial
solution may impose or offer, respectively.
When it comes to theories of causation that may help us
achieve our goals, using the tools of law, we may often care
more for utility than for reality. In this respect, evolutionary
analysis in law is similar to economic analysis of law. In
each case, the legal system is more concerned with the utility of the hypotheses about how humans will behave than it
is with the accuracy of the factual premises on which various hypotheses about human behaviour are based.
Don’t get me wrong. Accuracy is a virtue in its own right.
But, just as it sometimes does not matter for legal purposes
whether people consciously choose to maximize their selfinterest or merely act ‘as if ’ they were so choosing, it often
will not matter whether people consciously choose behaviours that would have improved their reproductive success
in ancestral or current environments, if they generally act
‘as if ’ they were so choosing.
Consequently, when considering whether information
from the biological sciences may be incorporated into legal
policy-making, these conclusions emerge. First, it is perfectly appropriate, in some circumstances, to base changes
in the legal system on reasonable hypotheses as opposed,
to well-confirmed hypotheses. Second, it is perfectly
appropriate, again in some circumstances, to base changes
in the legal system on the triangulation of information from
many different points, even if none of these is individually
compelling.
One of several possible approaches (the discussion of
which may at least illuminate several important factors to
be judged) would be to ask this: is the information or
approach suggested by developments in another discipline
sufficiently likely to improve matters to warrant at least its
temporary use in a legal context, given what is at stake?
Several aspects of this approach bear further discussion.
First, this hypothetical formulation of an initial approach
to interdisciplinarity in law is fundamentally sensitive to the
existing state of affairs. That is, one must have some loosely
quantified sense of the magnitude of existing harms, in the
context under discussion. (For example, an incident of
domestic physical abuse is typically far more serious than
an incident of littering.)
Second, use in law is rarely a one-way ratchet. So use can
be temporary and can result in periodic modifications as
legal policy-makers seek improved solutions. Also, we
should not neglect the potential for the legal system to be
part of the hypothesis-testing enterprise. For one of the
purposes to which a hypothesis can be put, in law, is to use
it tentatively and selectively in an effort to test its potential
utility.
Third, our approach to interdisciplinarity should
be sensitive not only to the potential benefits that
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incorporating the perspective might bring but also to the
potential harms that such incorporation may involve. A
decision on whether to incorporate a biobehavioural perspective should attend to the net of the costs and benefits.
Note that the question is not whether or not this perspective will single-handedly achieve some pre-articulated policy goal. The question is whether the best possible
approaches incorporating this perspective stand a sufficient
chance of being better than what we currently have. That
is, the assessment here is comparative, not absolute,
because an improvement over existing affairs may warrant
use, even in the absence of a fully optimal outcome.
Finally, any useful approach probably requires some
assessment of the probability that the projected benefits
will come to pass. That complex assessment requires
judgement as informed and sound as feasible under the circumstances, though it will be necessarily imperfect.
What all this means, in the context of human behaviour,
is that the legal system should adopt an approach that is
inherently sceptical, but not unduly so, scrutinizing of
scientific developments, but not wholly risk averse, and
calibrated by judgement of the harms avoided and the
potential gains to be had. This means that, while it should
encourage and expect of science all the usual rigours of
science, it should not exclude proffered findings of biology
any more aggressively than it excludes equally tentative
proffered findings of psychology, psychiatry, sociology or
economics. That is, we can, at the same time, believe on the
one hand that we should aggressively seek a greater understanding of reality and believe on the other hand that we
need not be certain before we act, because certainty may
come either never or too late.
5. EXAMPLES
I have elsewhere addressed several methodological and
substantive issues in evolutionary analysis in law ( Jones
1997a, 1999, 2001a), and, in a work in progress, Yale biologist Timothy Goldsmith and I propose more than a dozen
different categories of utility, with brief examples of each
( Jones & Goldsmith 2005). Below I provide a short overview of four of them: clarifying cost–benefit analyses; providing theoretical foundation and potential predictive
power; assessing comparative effectiveness of legal strategies; and revealing deep patterns in legal architecture.
(a) Clarifying cost–benefit analyses
One of the advantages for law of an evolutionary
approach to understanding brain design is that it can help
us to clarify some of the cost–benefit analyses legal thinkers
undertake when assessing various approaches to legal problems. Sometimes, an evolutionary perspective reveals that
two policies, deemed independent, may trade against each
other at the subsurface, such that the pursuit of either one
inhibits the pursuit of the other.
For example, it is clear that the legal system is charged
with attempting to reduce the sum of the costs of infanticide and the costs of reducing infanticide. It is also clear
that many people would like to see the legal system reduce
historically prevalent stigmatization of step-parents (and
perhaps even move to bring step-parents into greater legal
parity with genetic parents).
An extremely rich and broad evolutionary literature
(Hausfater & Hrdy 1984; Parmigiani & vom Saal 1994;
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)

and surveyed in Jones 1997a) provides ample reason to
believe that these two policies may trade against each other.
Infanticide in numerous species, widely distributed across
taxa, is often perpetrated by a male against an unweaned
infant of a mother with whom he might (and later often
does) mate. Natural selection appears to have favoured, in
many species, a male predisposition towards such selective
infanticide because it tends to increase the male’s reproductive success. The behaviour is extremely narrowly
tailored along many dimensions. For example, the risk to
an unweaned infant (whose nursing causes lactational
amenorrhoea, a contraceptive effect) is far greater than the
risk to a slightly older infant that has ceased nursing. In
humans the risk to an unweaned infant of infanticide is
roughly 100-fold greater if there is an unrelated adult male
in the household than if the male is the genetic father, and
this risk drops off just as precipitously, post-weaning, as it
does in other species.
This suggests that if the legal system were, for example,
legislatively to bias the limited investigative resources of
child protective services toward homes with step-parents
over homes with genetic parents, when rumours of child
abuse were received as to each, it might help to reduce the
rate of infanticide. Of course, that benefit might come at
the cost of stigmatizing the vast majority of step-parents
who never abuse.
Biology cannot tell us whether to prefer preventing
infanticide over preventing stigmatization. The point here,
however, is that evolutionary analysis can help to sharpen
the cost–benefit analysis. The cost of continuing to pursue
the non-stigmatization goal may now be increased by the
potential cost of a few otherwise preventable infant deaths.
Alternatively, the cost of preventing those deaths may be
the increased stigmatization of step-parents who never
abuse. Whichever course we choose, evolutionary analysis
puts the potential advantages or disadvantages in sharper
relief.
(b) Providing theoretical foundation and potential
predictive power
Evolutionary analysis in law may offer, at times, theoretical foundation for known human behavioural data. For
example, there is, at present, no satisfying non-evolutionary foundation for a wide number of puzzling human ‘irrationalities’. (Rationality, in the economic sense adopted
here, refers not to procedural rationality, in the sense of
conscious deliberation, but rather to substantive rationality, in the sense that the outcome of the behaviour is
appropriate for achieving particular goals, given conditions
and constraints, regardless of how the behaviour was actually chosen.) These puzzling irrationalities include such
things as the propensity to discount future interests too
steeply (over-valuing the small early gain relative to the
larger later gain) or to endow an object just received with a
higher value than the maximum price one would have paid
to acquire it. Such seeming irrationalities matter to legal
policies affecting, for example, rates of savings for retirement and the efficient distributions of property rights;
these policies, like many others in law, reflect the economic
assumption that people will make economically rational
and efficient decisions, and if the assumption is wrong, the
laws may be too. For example, people may save less for
their own retirements than expected, and they may refuse
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to bargain away a legal right that they would have refused to
purchase from someone else, making the initial distribution
of rights inefficiently ‘sticky’.
Existing theories purporting to explain the variety of irrationalities are largely ad hoc. They attribute such irrationalities to brain defects, assume they are the result of
insufficient capacity or time for the complex cognitive
processes necessary to reach rational decisions, or merely
re-label deviations from rational choice predictions
(describing endowment effects, for example, as a function
of ‘loss aversion’). Consequently, the theories provide no
theoretical framework to explain the particular patterns in
seeming irrationalities (such as why people would not be
equally likely to exhibit gain aversion as loss aversion).
They provide no underlying structure that would connect
together the wide variety of highly patterned deviations
from narrow economic rationality that we observe. And
they provide insufficient purchase on the problem to enable
prediction of as yet undiscovered patterns.
The evolutionary perspective on the human brain suggests that a great number of deviations from rational choice
predictions may reflect a temporal mismatch between
design features of the brain appropriate for ancestral environments and the quite different environments humans
encounter in modern times. Specifically, some irrationalities
may be as widely distributed as they are, in the patterns they
exhibit, because they predisposed people to behave in ways
that led to substantively rational outcomes in past environments. That is, they may be what I have elsewhere referred
to as ‘time-shifted rationalities’ (TSRs) ( Jones 2001a).
A TSR reflects the propensity of the human brain to bias
perception, information processing, emotions, tastes,
decision making and other states of the nervous system, as
a consequence of evolutionary processes, in ways tending
to increase the probability of behaviours that were adaptive, on average, in ancestral environments, even if those
behaviours are maladaptive in present circumstances
( Jones 2001a). Some economically irrational behaviours
currently ascribed to cognitive limitations may reflect not
defects, random effects or inevitable computational limitations, but rather finely tuned features of brain design that
are bumping up against novel environmental features in a
way that yields outcomes that are puzzlingly irrational only
if measured for rationality in present environments.
Thus, for example, contemporary human patterns in
discounting future interests may be out of step with
novel environmental features such as (i) sharply increased
median lifespans, (ii) sharply increased probabilities of
minimally stable futures and (iii) the invention of currencies and financial institutions that enable long-term storage
of value. In addition, patterns in over-endowing items just
acquired may reflect the modern invention of abstract
tradable ‘rights’ to receive resources in the future.
(c) Assessing comparative effectiveness of legal
strategies
From economics, we know that when the cost of a good
increases the demand for that good generally decreases.
Similarly, from the combined insights of law and
economics, we know that when the cost of a behaviour
increases (through legal sanctions, for example) the incidence of that behaviour tends to decrease, and the inciPhil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)

O. D. Jones

1705

dence decreases along a demand curve that describes the
relative sensitivity of the demand to the legal ‘prices’.
Speaking quite generally, a steeper more vertical demand
curve (or portion of a curve) means that it takes a greater
increase in sanctions to yield a given drop in demand. A
more horizontal curve (or portion of a curve) means there is
a far greater drop in demand for a given increase in sanctions. So far so good. But how steep are the curves for different behaviours? What return—measured in decreased
behaviour—will we get for a given investment in costly
sanctions, for a given behaviour we seek to deter?
Slutsky’s equations, economists tell us, can help us to
predict the trade-offs people will make, among various
alternative behaviours, given people’s preferences with
respect to those activities (Varian 2003). However, taking
people’s preferences as given is precisely what we do not
want to do. We want to know enough about where those
preferences come from, and what forms they are likely
to take, to design maximally efficient incentives and
disincentives using the tools of law.
As I have argued elsewhere ( Jones 2000, 2001a,c), we
can derive a general approach from the general principle
of TSR. Specifically, I define ‘the law of law’s leverage’ as
follows:
the magnitude of legal intervention necessary to reduce or to
increase the incidence of any human behaviour will correlate
positively or negatively, respectively, with the extent to which a
predisposition contributing to that behaviour was adaptive for
its bearers, on average, in past environments.
( Jones 2001a, p.1190)

A more accurate (but more cumbersome) rephrasing is
this: the magnitude of legal intervention necessary to
reduce or to increase the incidence of any human behaviour
will correlate positively or negatively, respectively, with the
extent to which a behaviour-biasing information-processing predisposition underlying that behaviour (i) increased
the inclusive fitness of those bearing the predisposition, on
average, more than it decreased it, across all those bearing
the predisposition, in the environment in which it evolved,
and (ii) increased the inclusive fitness of those bearing the
predisposition more, on average, than did any alternative
predisposition that happened to appear in the environment
during the same period.
Consequently, it will under most circumstances be less
costly to shift a behaviour in ways that tended to increase
reproductive success in ancestral environments (measured,
of course, in inclusive-fitness terms) than it will be to shift
behaviour in ways that tended to decrease reproductive
success in ancestral environments. I should not be read to
suggest that evolutionary processes are not still operating
on human populations. But the general point here is that
the slope of the demand curve for historically adaptive
behaviour that is now deemed undesirable will tend to be
far steeper (reflecting less sensitivity to price) than the
corresponding slope for behaviour that was comparatively
less adaptive in ancestral environments. This rule is likely
to hold even when the costs that an individual actually
and foreseeably incurs in behaving in a historically adaptive
way exceed the presently foreseeable benefits of such
behaviour.
This predicts that, in criminal law, family law, torts, property and the like, behaviours involving the following
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things will prove more difficult to modify than the behaviour of median difficulty: mating, fairness, homicide, childrearing, status-seeking, property and territory, resource
accumulation, sexuality (including infidelity and jealousy),
speech, privacy, empathy, crimes of passion, moralistic
aggression, risk valuation and risk taking, cooperative or
altruistic behaviour, male mate-guarding and related violence and the like ( Jones 2004a; Jones & Goldsmith 2005).
The law of law’s leverage may offer some novel and
useful insights into the different ways in which law and
behaviour interact, even if it will not predict with precision
either the demand curves for given behaviours or the individualized curves of a single person. By highlighting for legal
thinkers the fact that the brain tends to process information
in ways that tended to yield adaptive solutions to problems
encountered in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, the law of law’s leverage encourages the anticipation
that behavioural inclinations will vary in their susceptibility
to different legal tools in non-arbitrary loosely predictable
ways. This may enable legal thinkers to estimate more
accurately the relative costs and benefits to society of
attempting to shift different human behaviours in different
ways.
(d) Revealing deep patterns in legal architecture
Evolutionary analysis may also eventually provide a window into why human legal systems tend to manifest some
of the features they do. My hypothesis (explored further in
Jones 2001b) is that—just as beaver dams, despite their differences, all reflect the effects of evolutionary processes on
beaver brains—legal systems, despite their differences, all
reflect the effects of evolutionary processes on human
brains. That is, it will be possible to view at least many of
the largest-scale features of legal systems as reflections of
human neural architecture.
Consider, for example, that we might trace the characteristics of legal regimes—with respect to a particular
subject—according to four variables. Topics would describe
the main things that people care about. Content would capture the normative preferences that people generally associate with that topic. Tools would reflect the types of legal
interventions deemed useful in attempting to ensure that
individuals conform to the content preferences. Effort
would quantify the relative amount of difficulty in using
that tool to ensure conformity to the content preferences.
An evolutionary perspective suggests that, were we to trace
the variations in these four variables for the main features of
legal regimes around the world and across time, we would
see a decidedly non-random macro-pattern in legal
regimes. This would reflect the species-typical brain.
For example, we would expect to see great concern
devoted to the acquisition of private resources. From
which, perhaps, emerges a finite set of materially similar
approaches to the law of property. We would expect to see
concern for facilitating exchanges and gains from trade.
From which, perhaps, emerge a finite set of materially similar approaches to the law of contracts. We would expect to
see sharp concern for bodily safety. From which, perhaps,
emerges a finite set of materially similar approaches to laws
concerning crimes and torts. We would expect to see great
concern devoted to the subject of mating and child-rearing.
Hence family law, etc.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)

6. CONCLUSION
The complexity of human behaviours provides unending
challenges for legal systems, which seek to regulate some of
those behaviours with the tools of law. Yet, behind that
complexity is an even more complex human brain, which in
turn reflects the intricate interactions of genes and environments.
We know that the interaction between genes and environments is governed by evolutionary forces: natural and
sexual selection, drift, gene flow and mutation. So, in
theory, the more we know about the ways in which these
forces ultimately affect species-typical brain design, the
better we can know the subject we regulate with law and the
better we may be able to guide behaviour in democratically
percolated and pre-articulated directions that are socially,
politically and economically desirable. It seems time, given
what we know, what we do not and the tools at our disposal, that we focus more of the attention of legal thinkers
on the brain itself.
Advances in neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, psychopharmacology, neuroimaging and evolutionary biology
have helped us begin to fathom how the brain actually does
what it does. Although this will doubtless provide no magic
window on behaviour, making all causes transparent to
modern science, even incremental improvements are
improvements nonetheless. It seems clear that we should
not exalt biology over all other sources of knowledge. At
the same time, it is clear that biological perspectives on the
brain, its information-processing characteristics and the
behaviours to which these lead are essential components of
any modern understanding of behaviour. They are consequently important for law.
I thank Michael Saks, Jane Maienschein and Richard Creath
for helpful comments.
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